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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The sole issue presented for review is whether the Indus-
trial Commission applied the proper standards and follow the 
proper guidelines in determining that Anna F. Webster was par-
tially dependent at the time of the dependency review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The material facts in this case are not in dispute. 
On July 20, 1979, Anna F. Webster's husband sustained multi-
ple injuries to his head and body in a motorcycle accident which 
occurred while in the course of his employment. Tr. 78. 
In August, 1979, Plaintiff began making temporary total 
disability benefits payments. These benefits were changed to 
permanent total disability benefits on February 23, 1981 based 
upon a report prepared by Dr. Robert Baer. Tr. 139. 
On December 15, 1982, Anna F. Webster's husband died due to 
complications associated with the accident. On January 26, 1983, 
the Commission ordered Plaintiff to pay an additional 116 weeks 
of benefits of $179.00 per week. These benefits, added to those 
previously paid, equalled 312 weeks of death benefits at the 
maximum rate of $179.00 per week. Tr. 78 and 139. 
Plaintiff continued to make the ordered payments until 
March, 1985. In February, 1985, Anna Webster wrote a letter to 
the Second Injury Fund inquiring about obtaining benefits beyond 
the initial 312 weeks. Tr. 78 and 139. The Second Injury Fund 
denied responsibility for additional benefits. Tr. 25-26 and 
139-140. Anna Webster filed an Application for a Hearing re-
questing continued benefits. Tr. 30. 
Following a hearing on June 26, 1985, the Administrative Law 
Judge concluded that Anna F. Webster was partially dependent but 
reduced her weekly benefits from $179.50 to $89.50 per week. Tr. 
79-80. 
The Administrative Law Judge considered numerous factors in 
determining that Anna F. Webster was entitled to continued but 
reduced benefits. Tr. 79-80. 
The Commission affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's Order 
and denied Plaintiff's Motion for Review on January 9, 1986. Tr. 
139-141. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission followed the mandate of Utah Code 
Annotated §35-1-68 (1985) and extensively reviewed the issue of 
dependency. Before determining that Anna F. Webster was partial-
ly dependent and reducing her benefits from $716.00 to $358.00 
per month, the Industrial Commission through the Administrative 
Law Judge carefully reviewed all relevant facts. The Industrial 
Commission examined Anna F. Webster's monthly income which was 
$1,315.00, more than one-half of which was the dependency bene-
fits. In addition, the Commission examined her monthly expenses 
which totaled approximately $1,300.00. 
In fashioning a fair and reasonable remedy, the Commission 
was fully aware of the fact that Anna F. Webster would no longer 
have a mortgage on her home as of September, 1985 and accordingly 
would no longer have that monthly expense. Additionally, the 
Commission also held that interest earned by Anna F. Webster's 
savings should be considered income. Nevertheless, the Indus-
trial Commission, after all of the evidence was considered, 
affirmed a finding of partial dependency but decreased the month-
ly amount by half. 
This Court should apply two standards in reviewing the Com-
mission's Order. First, in reviewing questions of law, it must 
apply the "correction of error" standard. It is submitted that 
the Commission committed no reversible error in the manner in 
which it applied the law. 
Second, in reviewing the Commission's findings, it must 
apply an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Again, it is sub-
mitted that the Commission committed no reversible error. The 
findings of the Commission are supported by competent evidence 
and are not arbitrary and capricious. The Commission considered 
all of the evidence at the time of the dependency review. 
The Commission utilized the proper standards and guidelines 
to promote the purpose of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act and 
to comply with the applicable general rules of law. By applying 
these standards and guidelines the Commission properly concluded 
that Anna F. Webster need not use her savings (principal) to 
relieve Plaintiff of its statutory obligation to pay her as the 
widow of a deceased former employee. 
Anna F. Webster has demonstrated her dependency by competent 
evidence and therefore is entitled to have the Order awarding her 
partial dependency benefits affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN 
FINDING THAT ANNA F. WEBSTER IS PARTIALLY DEPENDENT 
This Court has established certain standards when reviewing 
orders of the Industrial Commission. If this Court is reviewing 
the Commission's interpretation of general questions of law, it 
applies a "correction-of~error" standard, with no deference given 
to the Commission's interpretation. Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth 
v. Morse, Utah, 692 P.2d 779, 782 (1984). This standard requires 
this Court to determine whether the Commission has complied with 
the guidelines of the law. Utah Department of Administrative 
Services v. Public Service Commission, Utah, 658 P.2d 601, 608 
(1983). 
If this Court is reviewing the Commission's Findings of 
Fact, it applies an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Blaine 
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah, 700 P.2d 1084, 1086 
(1985). This standard requires that the Commission's findings 
are not to be displaced in the absence of a showing that they are 
arbitrary and capricious. Id. 
The issue of dependency must be determined based upon the 
facts and circumstances at the time of review as provided in Utah 
Code Annotated, §35-1-68(2)(b)(iii) (1985). That section pro-
vides as follows: 
The issue of dependency shall be subject to 
review by the commission at the end of the 
initial six-year period and annually there-
after. If in any such review it is deter-
mined that, under the facts and circumstances 
existing at that time, the applicant is no 
longer a wholly dependent person, the appli-
cant may be considered a partly dependent or 
nondependent person and shall be paid such 
benefits as the commission may determine 
pursuant to Subsection (2)(c)(ii). 
Section 35-1-68(2)(c)(ii) also provides that the issue of partial 
dependency "shall be determined by the Commission in keeping with 
the circumstances and conditions of dependence existing at the 
time of the dependency review." 
Plaintiff unconvincingly argues that the Commission did not 
follow the statutory guidelines "of taking into consideration all 
facts and circumstances11 at the time of the dependency review. 
Plaintiff's brief, p. 10. To support this argument, Plaintiff 
cites a statement made by the Administrative Law Judge. The 
weakness of this argument is exposed by even a cursory examina-
tion of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on 
July 2, 1985. The Administrative Law Judge took into considera-
tion Anna F. Webster's current income, including interest earned 
by her savings [Tr. 79]. The Administrative Law Judge also con-
sidered Anna Webster's current monthly expenses [Tr. 79 and 
140]. And, the Administrative Law Judge further noted that such 
expenses included the mortgage payments on her home which would 
terminate in September, 1985 and, accordingly, would no longer be 
a monthly expense. Tr. 79. 
Based upon the specific facts which the Administrative Law 
Judge considered at the time of the dependency review, it is 
submitted that the Administrative Law Judge complied with the 
mandates of the statute. It is further submitted that the find-
ings of the Administrative Law Judge were neither arbitrary nor 
capricious because there is unquestionably a reasonable basis to 
support such findings. 
II 
ANNA F. WEBSTER WAS DEPENDENT UPON THE 
CONTINUED PAYMENT 0£ WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS AT THE TIME OF THE DEPENDENCY REVIEW 
At the time of the dependency review, Anna F. Webster was 
receiving $716.00 in Workers1 Compensation benefits. These bene-
fits constituted over one-half of her monthly income [ Tr. 79]. 
Mrs. Websterfs dependency upon such benefits is convincingly 
demonstrated by the fact that she was forced to invade her life 
savings when Plaintiff terminated her benefits [Tr. 79]. 
The standard to establish dependency under the Utah Workers1 
Compensation Act, which Appellant broadly paraphrases in its 
brief at page 10, was set forth by this Court in Farnsworth v. 
Industrial Commission, Utah, 534 P.2d 897 (1975). This Court 
stated: 
[T]hat dependency within the terms of the 
statute does not mean absolute dependency for 
the necessities of life, but rather that the 
applicant looked to and relied on the contri-
butions of the workman, in whole oc in part, 
as a means of supporting and maintaining 
himself in accordance with his social posi-
tion and accustomed mode of life. Id. at 
899. 
This standard has been utilized by this Court in numerous deci-
sions. Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, Utah, 36 P.2d 979 (1934). Star v. Industrial Commission, 
Utah, 615 P.2d 436 (1980) . 
Plaintiff attempts to cloud this issue by demonstrating its 
prowess at arithmetic. Plaintiff's brief, p. 5. Nonetheless, 
the undisputable fact is that, at the time of the dependency 
review, the compensation benefits constituted more than one-half 
of her montly income [Tr. 79]. Despite this fact, Plaintiff 
suggests that Mrs. Webster is not dependent upon such benefits to 
maintain herself in accordance with her social position and 
accustomed mode of life. 
It is respectfully suggested that the Commission is not 
obligated to consider an alternative social position and mode of 
life for Mrs. Webster. The fundamental goal of Workers1 Compen-
sation is to compensate widows for the income lost when their 
spouses are killed at work so that they can maintain the social 
position she and her husband had acquired at the time of his 
death. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that Mrs. Webster demonstrated 
her continued but partial dependency and that the Commission 
fashioned a fair and reasonable remedy to further the purpose of 
the Workers1 Compensation Act. Hence, this Court should affirm 
the final and administrative decision of the Commission. 
Ill 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION APPLIED THE 
"PROPER STANDARDS AND FOLLOWED PROPER 
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING THAT ANNA F. 
WEBSTER WAS PARTIALLY DEPENDENT 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-68(2)(b)(iii) (1985) empowers the 
Industrial Commission to review the issue of dependency. The 
Commission is required by that section to consider facts and 
circumstances existing at the time of review to determine whether 
an applicant is a "wholly dependent person11. If not, the appli-
cant may be considered partially dependent and shall be paid such 
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benefits as the Commission may determine pursuant to §35-1-
68(2)(c)(ii) (1985). 
Such payment shall be based upon the circumstances and con-
ditions at the time of the dependency review and will be paid in 
a weekly amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that a 
partially dependent would receive if wholly dependent. Utah Code 
Annotated, §35-1-68(2)(c)(ii) (1985). 
Applying the foregoing statutory guidelines to the instant 
case, it becomes evident that the Commission did apply the proper 
standards and guidelines. 
The findings adopted by the Commission refer to Anna F. 
Webster's monthly income and expenses at the time of the depend-
ency review. In addition, the findings acknowledge the fact that 
her mortgage payment would end in September, 1985. Based upon 
the facts and upon all other evidence, the Administrative Law 
Judge concluded that she was partially dependent. 
Section 35-1-68(2)(b)(iii) (1985) accords the Commission the 
discretion to determine that an applicant may be partially 
dependent. Section 35-1-68(2)(c) (ii) (1985) then empowers the 
Commission to award benefits, the amount of which shall not ex-
ceed a stated limit. 
Accordingly, this Court must conclude that the Commission 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously before the Commissioners1 
Order can be reversed. There is, however, no evidence that the 
Commission acted in such a manner. In fact, the Commissioners1 
and the Administrative Law Judge1s Order contradict such a con-
clusion. The Administrative Law Judge considered all relevant 
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facts and circumstances and the Commission found that the Admin-
istrative Law Judge fashioned a fair remedy considering not only 
Anna Webster's interest but also Plaintiff's interest. Such a 
decision cannot be considered arbitrary or capricious. There-
fore, the Commisioners' Order should be affirmed. 
IV 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT 
ERR WrififrJ It RgftfSfib TO REQUIRE ANNA F. 
WEBSTER TO USE HER SAVINGS 
Professor Larson has stated the general rule in cases in-
volving the issue of partial dependency and a claimant who has 
other sources of support: 
Partial dependency may be found when, al-
though the claimant may have other substan-
tial sources of support from his own work, 
from property, or from other persons on whom 
claimant is also dependent, the contributions 
made by the decedent were looked to by the 
claimant for the maintenance of his accus-
tomed standard of living. 2 Larson, Work-
men's Compensation Law, 563.12(a) (1983). 
Plaintiff in its argument has failed to grasp the fundamental 
purpose of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. Plaintiff assumes 
that since Mrs. Webster has managed to save some money she is not 
entitled to any benefits. This assumption, however, is in con-
flict with the general rule espoused by Professor Larson and with 
the purpose inherent in the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
Professor Larson concludes that the Court must look at 
whether the decedent's contributions to Anna F. Webster were used 
to maintain her accustomed standard of living. The evidence 
establishes at the time of the dependency review that the bene-
fits received by Anna F. Webster constituted more than one-half 
of her monthly income. This clearly establishes that Anna F. 
Webster looked to contributions made by her deceased husband for 
the maintenance of her accustomed standard of living. 
The purpose of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act has been 
defined by this Court as follows: 
[The purpose] is to provide compensation for 
the probable financial loss suffered by de-
pendents on account of the death of the dece-
dent. Farnsworth, supra, 534 P.2d at 900; 
Star, supra, 6L5 P.2d at 439. 
In an effort to escape the above quoted general rule and the 
stated purpose of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act, Plaintiff 
cites two clearly distinguishable cases from other jurisdic-
tions. The first is Akin v. Akin Distributors, Inc., Okla., 386 
P.2d 769 (1963). In that case, the claimant failed to produce 
sufficient evidence that she was dependent upon her son within 
the meaning of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act. The evi-
dence in that case did establish that claimant earned a substan-
tial income, in addition to owning valuable stock. Her deceased 
son merely contributed $50.00 per month. Under that set of 
facts, the Court was required to affirm the conclusion that the 
claimant was not dependent. The Court refused to disturb a find-
ing which was supported by competent evidence. _IcL at 772. 
In the present case, the Commissioners1 Order finding 
Anna F. Webster partially dependent and, accordingly, reducing 
her monthly benefits from $716.00 per month to $358.00 per month 
is also supported by competent evidence. That Order was based 
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after all material facts and circumstances were carefully, and 
fairly, considered by the Commission. 
The second case cited by Plaintiff is Terrinoni v. Westward 
Ho!, Fla., 418 So.2d 1143 (1982). In that case the Florida Court 
was struggling with a Florida statute which is substantially 
different from the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act. Claimant had 
received a substantial sum of benefits from a combination of 
sources. The Florida Court held that the Florida statute and 
Florida case law supported the conclusion that there comes a time 
when dependency benefits may be terminated. 
Utah statute also provides for a termination of such bene-
fits. §35-1-68(2)(b)(iii) mandates that the issue of dependency 
shall be reviewed after the initial six-year period and annually 
thereafter. Therefore, if the Commission finds, based upon the 
facts and circumstances at the time of such review, that a claim-
ant is no longer dependent, then benefits can be terminated. 
In the instant case, however, the Commission concluded that 
Mrs. Webster is no longer wholly dependent but is partially de-
pendent. Therefore, it reduced her dependency benefits by fifty 
percent (50%) from $716.00 to $358.00 per month. It has not been 
demonstrated that the Commission1s Order is not supported by 
competent evidence; therefore, it should be affirmed. 
V 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR BY FAILING 
TO HOLD OR TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACT THAT 
"5NNA f. WfiBSffiR'S CLOTHING EXPENSE WAS EXCESSTW 
11 
As has been amply demonstrated herein, the purpose of de-
pendency benefits is to afford the claimant the ability to main-
tain her standard of living. The Administrative Law Judge and 
the Industrial Commission carefully reviewed all the evidence 
which was submitted, including Mrs. Webster's clothing expense. 
Obviously the Commission's collective conscience was not shocked 
by that expense. It is submitted that Plaintiff's conscience is 
insufficient reason to reverse a proper Order. 
VI 
ANNA F. WEBSTER IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE 
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS AS AWARDED BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION "REGARDLESS OF WHO 
THIS COURT FEELS SHOULD PAY SUCH BENEFITS 
Plaintiff has raised an argument that pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §35-1-70 (1953), it should not be required to pay 
extended dependency benefits to Mrs. Webster. It is Plaintiff's 
position that the payment of such benefits are the responsibility 
of the Second Injury Fund. 
It is the position of Anna F. Webster that she has clearly 
demonstrated her entitlement to additional dependency benefits. 
Her entitlement is not affected by this argument. Therefore, 
Mrs. Webster respectfully requests that this Court decide who 
should pay her the benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Anna F. Webster has produced competent evidence to support 
her claim for additional dependency benefits. The Industrial 
Commission considered not only that evidence, but all evidence as 
well as the interests of the parties. The Commission's final 
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administrative decision is fair and reasonable under the circum-
stances. In light of the foregoing, Anna F. Webster respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the Commission's Order. 
DATED this ^ o m day of June, 1986. 
DABNEY, 
VIR< 
Attornefys for 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct 
copies, postage pre-paid, of the foregoing document on this 
the 3s>ttt day of June, 1986, to the following: 
David L. Wilkinson, Esq. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Attorneys for Industrial Commission 
Office of the Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Larry R. White, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Employer/Insurance Carrier 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Vlf^Slfr'DABNEY/, E^T/ 
Attorneys for Webster 
ADDENDUM 
_ i /. _ 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CASE No.85000250 
ANNA WEBSTER, Widow of 
GENE WEBSTER, deceased, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
L.D.S. HOSPITAL 
(SELF-INSURED), 
Defendant 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 26, 1985, 
at 8:30 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and Notice 
of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius 
Dabney, Attorney at Law. 
The Defendant was present and represented by Larry 
White, Attorney at Law. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the parties requested 
that the Administrative Law Judge take the matter under advisement until June 
28, at noon, to allow them an opportunity to reach a settlement of the case. 
No settlement having been received by noon on June 28, 1985, the 
Administrative Law Judge is prepared to enter the follow. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The Applicant herein, Anna Webster, is the widow of Gene Webster, who 
sustained a fatal industrial injury on July 20, 1979, while in the course or 
scope of his employment with the defendant, L.D.S. Hospital. The injured 
worker eventually died from his injuries on December 15, 1982. On January 26, 
1983, the Industrial Commission entered an Order providing for the payment of 
death benefits to the surviving spouse of the deceased, Anna Webster, the 
Applicant herein. As the result of that Order, the Applicant was paid death 
benefits at the rate of $179.00 per week through March 20, 1985, by the 
Defendant. 
On or about March 15, 1985, the Applicant filed an application for 
continuing death benefits from the Defendant, pursuant to Section 35-1-68, 
Utah Code Annotated. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* FINDINGS OF FACT 
* 
* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
* 
* AND ORDER 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * * * 
ANNA WEBSTER, Widow 
GENE WEBSTER, Deceased 
FINDING OF FACT 
PAGE TWO 
Section 35-1-68 (b)(iv) provides that "...In determining the then 
existing annual income of the surviving spouse, the Commission shall exclude 
501 of any Social Security Death Benefits received by that surviving spouse." 
The Applicant's present income consists of the $479.00 per month she receives 
from Social Security for a disability award due to her rheumatoid arthritis, 
and $120.00 per month which she receives from the L.D.S. Hospital retirement 
plan. Prior to the termination of the benefits by the Defendant, she was also 
receiving $716.00 in compensation benefits, for a total monthly income of 
$1,315.00. The Applicant's expenses are approximately $1,300.00. As the 
result of the death of her husband, the Applicant collected $36,000.00 in life 
insurance proceeds, and as the result of the death of her mother, she received 
$9,000.00. The Applicant testified that she has $85,000.00 in money market 
certificates. AS the result oi those certificates, the Applicant earned 
approximately $8,000.00 last year in interest income. However, she did not 
invade any of her savings until the Defendant terminated her benefits, 
whereupon she spent $2,600.00 of' her savings. It was also revealed that the 
Applicant would be paying off her mortgage in September of 1985, and 
accordingly would no longer have that monthly expense. 
Without considering the interest income, it would appear* at first 
blush that the Applicant would be wholly dependant on the benefits provided by 
the Defendant, since they constitute over one half of her monthly income. The 
Defendant, by and through counsel, has taken the position that the Applicant 
should place her $85,000.00 in high yielding annuities, and that by doing so, 
she would realize a higher income than she receives from her money market 
certificates. However, the Administrative .Law Judge feels that the Defendant, 
is missing the point. The point being, that it is not the Applicant's 
responsibility to find the highest yielding investment so that the insurance 
carrier may be benefited. However, the Administrative Law Judge does feel 
that the interest income should be considered in determining the Applicant's 
disposable income. In other words, the Administrative Law Judge finds that 
the interest earned by a surviving spouse should be included as income, 
however the Applicant should not be forced to invade the principal or corpus, 
in order to meet the everyday necessities of life. After considering all of 
the evidence on the file, the Administrative Law Judge feels that the fairest 
finding in this case, would be a finding of partial dependency. Further, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds that the Defendant should pay the Applicant 
$89.50 per week or $358.00 every four weeks which sum represents one half of 
the allowance for full dependency. 
With respect to the annual dependency review called for in Section 68 
of the Act, the Defendant shall send an Affidavit of Dependency form, which 
will be promulgated by the Commission in the near future, to the Applicant. 
The form should be sent at least sixty (60) days prior to the one (1) year 
anniversary of the date of this Order. The form will be sent to the defendant 
and the Industrial Commission by Mrs. Webster. The Defendant shall not 
suspend or terminate benefits to Mrs. Webster after the anniversary date of 
this order, unless the Affidavit of Dependency indicates a significant change 
in her income level, either by increasing or decreasing. 
ANNA WEBSTER, Widow 
GENE WEBSTER, Deceased 
FINDING OF FACTS 
PAGE THREE 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Anna Webster is now partially dependent for support purposes. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant, L.D.S. Hospital 
(Self-Insured) pay Anna Webster, compensation at the rate of $89.50 per week 
commencing effective March 21, 1985, and continuing until further order of the 
Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant, L.D.S. Hospital (Self-Insured), 
shall send a Dependency Affidavit form to Anna Webster no later than sixty 
(60) days from the anniversary date of this Order. In the event there has 
been a substantial increase in Mrs. Websters* income, then the defendant may 
terminate benefits after the anniversary date of this Order, and the Applicant 
shall be entitled to a hearing before the Industrial Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
2_ day of July, 1985 
ATTEST: 
/s/ Linda J. Strasburp; 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on July 2 1985 a copy of the attached Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed to the following persons at 
the following addresses, postage paid: 
Anna Webster, 3864 South 850 West, Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney, 412 Reams Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101 
Scott Wetzel Services, 833 East 400 South Suite 104, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102 
Larry White, Attorney, 330 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Barbara 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000250 
ANNA WEBSTER, Widow of 
GENE WEBSTER, Deceased, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
L.D.S. HOSPITAL (Self-insured), 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On July 2, 1985, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission issued 
an Order requiring the Defendant in the above-captioned case to pay continued 
dependency death benefits to the widow/claimant, Anna Webster. The Defendant 
filed two ce^ r.r?.te Moticmr. frr P?v:,ew ?.p?»rtii:r' tv:" cfiffer^ r.t defenses. The 
first Motion for Review, filed August 28, 1985, argues that the widow/claimant 
is not a dependent because of the other financial resources available to her. 
The second Motion for Review, filed October 8, 1985, argues that if the 
Commission should find that the claimant was a dependent of the deceased, that 
the additional dependency death benefits should be paid out of the Second 
Injury Fund, and not by the Defendant Self-insured Employer. The Commission 
is of tttfe opinion that both Motions for Review should be denied. A review of 
the file follows. 
On July 20, 1979, the now-deceased husband of the claimant sustained 
multiple injuries to the head and body in a motorcycle accident which occurred 
while he was making a delivery for the Defendant while in the course of his 
employment. The Defendant Self-insured Employer began the payment of 
temporary total disability benefits in August of 1979. On February 23, 1981, 
these benefits were changed to permanent total disability benefits because of 
a physician report prepared by Dr. Robert Baer which indicated that the 
condition of the claimant's husband continued to deteriorate. On December 15, 
1982, the claimant's husband died due to complications associated with the 
accident-caused arteriosclerotic cerebrovascular disease. On January 10, 
1983, the claimant filed an application for death benefits. On January 26, 
1983, the Commission issued an Order requiring the Defendant to pay an 
additional 116 weeks of benefits at $179.00 per week. These ordered benefits, 
added to the already-paid 196 weeks of benefits, amounted to 312 weeks of 
death benefits at the maximum rate of $179.00 per week. 
Based on the January 16, 1983, Order, the Defendant continued to pay 
benefits to the claimant through March of 1985. In February of 1985, the 
claimant wrote a letter to the Second Injury Fund seeking information re-
garding continued benefits after the initial 312 weeks paid by the Defendant. 
The Second Injury Fund responded to her, in a letter dated March 4, 1985, that 
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due to the May 1979 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-68, the employer/carrier, and not 
the Second Injury Fund, was liable for any additional dependency benefits 
beyond the initial 312 weeks. Consequently, on March 15, 1985, the claimant 
filed an Application for Hearing to have the matter regarding continued 
benefits determined by an Administrative 'Law Judge. The Defendant answered 
the Application stating that the Defendant had already paid the 312 weeks of 
benefits specified in U.C.A. 35-1-68, and therefore, should not be liable for 
any additional benefits* 
On June 26, 1985, the hearing was held. On July 2, 1985, the 
Administrative Law Judge issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order awarding the claimant continued dependency benefits to be paid by the 
Defendant Self-insured Employer. The benefits were computed to be $89.50 per 
week, which amounted to one half the maximum rate of $179.00 per week which 
the Defendant paid to^the claimant during the initial 312 weeks. In deter-
mining the amount of benefits to be paid by the Defendant, the Administrative 
Law Judge took into consideration income the claimant was receiving from other 
sources as compared against her regular living expenses. Other incone in-
cluded Social Security benefits she received for her own rheumatoid ar ritis, 
retirement benefits due her deceased husband from the Defendant, and nterest 
she earned on a money market account with a corpus of $85,000.00. The 
Administrative Law Judge found that the claimant should not be required to 
invade the corpus of the money market account in order to meet her living 
expenses, and also ordered the continued benefits to be paid until a 
substantial change in the claimant*i dependency status occurred. 
On August 28, 1985, the Defendant filed the first Motion for Review. 
That Motion for Review objects to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that 
the claimant should not be required to invade the corpus of her money market 
account. The Motion argues that, at the time of the hearing, the claimant 
should not have been considered a dependent, as she had sufficient resources 
to provide for her necessities without the benefit of continued workers* 
compensation death benefits. The Defendant further argues that "the 
Administrative Law Judge failed to take into consideration the reduction of 
her expenses which would occur in October 1985 due to her completing the 
payments for the mortgage on her home. The Defendant points' out that once the 
mortgage was paid off, the claimant could pay all her lis-fced expenses without 
the continued benefits, and without ever invading the corpus of her savings. 
The Defendant argues that based on these considerations, the Administrative 
Law Judge should have denied the claimant continued death benefits as she was 
not dependent on outside income. 
On October 8, 1985, the Defendant wrote a letter to the Second Injury 
Fund requesting the Second Injury Fund to agree to pay the continued death 
benefits ordered by the Administrative Law Judge in the July 2, 1985, Order. 
This request was denied by the Second Injury Fund on October 3, 1985. Once 
again the Second Injury Fund pointed out that the May 1979 amendment to U.C.A. 
35-1-68 relieved the Second Injury Fund for the previously specified liability 
for continued death benefits beyond the initial 312 weeks. On October 18, 
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1985, the Defendant presented the Commission with a request to overrule the 
Administrative Law Judge, and order the continued benefits to be paid out of 
the Second Injury Fund. 
Regarding the Defendant's first Motion for Review, the Commission 
notes that the issue arises due to the lack of a concrete definition of 
dependency as specified in the Workers* Compensation Act. In this case, the 
issue is narrowed to whether or' not a claimant need exhaust all financial 
resources before a finding of dependency is appropriate. As there are no 
legislative guidelines in this area, the Commission ~*feels —that i^n this 
particular case, the Administrative Law Judge fairly fashioned the award of 
continued benefits by taking into account the interest income th$ claimant 
received from her savings and excluding the corpus. The Commission finds this 
to be an equitable compromise between the interests of the two parties, and 
therefore, must deny the Defendant's first Motion for Review. 
The Defendant's second Motion for Review must also be denied. The 
Commission is satisfied that the intent of the legislature's May 197? 
amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-68 was to relieve the increasing financial burde 
placed on the Second Injury Fund. The legislature provided this relief L> 
deleting the language in U.C.A. 35-1-68 specifying that the Second Injury Fund 
would be liable for continued dependency benefits. The code section which the 
Defendant feels contradicts this interpretation (U.C.A. 35-1-70) by specifying 
a 312-week limitation on benefit^ from the carrier is not applicable to 
continued dependency death benefits. That section applies to "special cases" 
which are* not specifically provided for by other code sections. As the 
Commission finds no clear contradiction in the reading of U.C.A. 35-1-68, and 
U.C.A* 35-1-70, the Defendant's second Motion for Review is also denied. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant's Motions for Review 
submitted on August 28, 1985, and October 8, 1985, are denied and the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order dated July 2, 1985, is hereby affirmed. 
K 
<\ 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah*, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
^ ^ day of January, 1986. 
ATTEST: 
^ 
vAAM^ 
Stephen M. Hadley, ChairmanX 
v\ 
Walter T. Axelgard, Cplranissioner 
^ ^ ^ T V . 
Lenice L. Nielsen, Comirassioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on January !C 1986, a copy of the attached 
Order Denying Motion for Review in the case of Anna Webster issued 
January 9 1986, was mailed to the following persons at the following 
addresses, postage paid: 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
P,0. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
-^Tirginius Dabney, Attorney at Law 
412 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Anna Webster 
3864 South 850 West 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Scott Wetzel Services 
833 East 400 South, Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Larry White, Attorney at Law 
330 South 300 EAst 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By .Al Lv.yi <?2<fltL 
DeAnn See ly 
